archives

Securing reflective towers

While reading papers on (behavioral) reflection, I keep pondering - how are they going to establish and maintain security in famous "reflective towers"? I have difficulties to understand, whether trying to do capabilities security in reflective setting is not going to result in infinite regress.

One would probably want to provide reflection via capabilities, which themselves may be a subject of reflective interest, etc.

I am not sure capabilities are any different from standard "turtles all the way down" issues of reflection (and meta-programming), though. I would like to come up with some formal model to play with it, but didn't succeed yet (probably I need to think a bit longer :) ). Does anybody have some pointers/ideas on how capabilities and reflection interwingle?

SAT 3 Proof with E Prover via OWL

An interesting little Semantic Web-related development reported by Jos De Roo (creator of the Java/C# Euler inference engine). He's got the E Prover (an equational theorem prover for clausal logic), to find a proof for the OWL (Web Ontology Language) test case "inconsistent502" (RDF, variations), which is a Description Logic encoding of one of the classic SAT 3 problems.

Description Logics in Literate Haskell

Experiments from Graham Klyne:

This file is my attempt to better understand the structure and uses
of Description Logic (DL) languages for knowledge reresentation and inference, with the ultimate aim of better understanding the capabilities and limitations of the Semantic Web ontology language OWL, whose design draws much from Description Logic languages.

See also rdfweb-dev post, "Haskell vs. Ada vs. C++ vs. Awk vs. ..., An Experiment in Software Prototyping Productivity" (PS format)