Type-Checking Zero Knowledge

This paper presents the ï¬rst type system for statically analyzing security protocols that are based on zero-knowledge proofs. We show how certain properties offered by zero-knowledge proofs can be characterized in terms of authorization policies and statically enforced by a type system. The analysis is modular and compositional, and provides security proofs for an unbounded number of protocol executions. We develop a new type-checker that conducts the analysis in a fully automated manner. We exemplify the applicability of our technique to real-world protocols by verifying the authenticity and secrecy properties of the Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) protocol. The analysis of DAA takes less than three seconds.

A little dependent type theory, a little Pi calculus, a little cryptography... there's something for everyone! This is follow-up work to this story that Ehud posted.

The source code can be found here.

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