Achieving Security Despite Compromise Using Zero-Knowledge
One of the important challenges when designing and analyzing cryptographic protocols is the enforcement of security properties in the presence of compromised participants. This paper presents a general technique for strengthening cryptographic protocols in order to satisfy authorization policies despite participant compromise. The central idea is to automatically transform the original cryptographic protocols by adding non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. Each participant proves that the messages sent to the other participants are generated
in accordance to the protocol. The zero-knowledge proofs are forwarded to ensure the correct behavior of all participants involved in the protocol, without revealing any secret data. We use an enhanced type system for zero-knowledge to verify that the transformed protocols conform to their authorization policy even if some participants are compromised. Finally, we developed a tool that automatically generates ML implementations of protocols based on zero-knowledge proofs. The protocol transformation, the veriï¬cation, and the generation of protocol implementations are fully automated.
This is the follow-up to this story. The prior work did not account for compromised participants. This work does.
I continue to be excited about the prospect of this previous story's work being applied to the type system described in this story, possibly resulting in an awesome new language for developing secure software.
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